BCWSC/26/1000 AI Lessons Learned the Hard Way
- 10:00 - 10:45 AI Lessons Learned the Hard Way - Person/Reid Gilman (Boston Children's Hospital)
- BCWSC/26
- Abstract
- There's tremendous opportunity in AI for many cybersecurity organizations, but there's also a lot of stumbling blocks.
- This talk will be a discussion of some lessons learned trying to solve real problems our cybersecurity team encounters using generative AI.
- This talk will not get into specific technical issues but will focus on themes and challenges we've encountered resolving real world problems.
- My Notes
- So many tickets, So Little Time
- arch
- ticketing system <-> python app <-> identity system
- flow
- retrieve tickets
- discard tickets using static rules to save money
- summarize description and comments
- begin topic-reviewer AI/Agent loop
- save ticket metadata, content, and AI analysis to a database
- topic-reviewer loop aka the topic agent
- sometimes summary is wrong.
- rule database
- topic agent spits out the topics it selected,
- reviewer agent is a boss and makes sure that the agent makes stuff up
this works really well
having this loop almost eliminated having it not make sense
you still get things that don't make sense; there's "co morbidity" between not having mfa and not getting on vpn
that brought me to a place where I was able to look at this and say that while the data we may have, when we assign a topic it's right enough to be useful
- but does it work?
- lessons learned
- pick problems where it's okay to be wrong
- My Note great wording
- An LLM can do a great job error-checking another LLM
- But not without Specific Instructions
- Track your token use
- Codex/CLI and Claude/Code are powerful tools
I'm not going to say Vibe Coding
references the idea of, if not the term of AI/Concept/Cognitive/Debt
- pick problems where it's okay to be wrong
Q&A
What were some application security concerns you ran into while developing your app
making sure that LLM provider is not using it for training
- mentions OWASP/LLM/Top 10
- mentions Prompt Injection but it's hyperbolic in the sense of "you could rm -rf my hard drive"
- doesn't really take this risk seriously
- service now offers something like this
- My Note most of the questions are not about prompt injection or the security of this
TODO what about prompt injection, do tickets only enter in through trusted channels? Question/My
what is policy about what people put into tickets